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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OSD review(s) completed.

FEB 9 1955

TO: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&P)  
FROM: The Director, Office of Domestic Security Programs *RMS*

Problem: To reply to the second letter dated 1 February 1955 (Tab A) from the Honorable Charles E. Bennett, MC, concerning the vulnerability of Florida to intelligence exploitation.

Discussion: Reference brief dated 26 January 1955 (Tab B) and letter to Congressman Bennett dated 28 January 1955 (Tab C).

There is little that can be added to the broad explanations offered in the first letter, since to do so would require going into reasonings that Mr. Bennett has no perceivable need to explore further.

Unable to close, in strict reciprocity, more than 30% of the continental U.S., the joint committee left 70% open, and part of the 70% contained important and sensitive areas.

Consideration was given to such factors as (1) Soviet travel patterns (no reported visits to Florida), (2) relativity of an area's strategic importance to the U.S. (Florida is not a most vital area), (3) deception (it cannot be said that the closed areas of North and South Dakota are very vital), (4) requirements of the AEC (large areas closed by AEC request required opening other areas), and (5) the fact that all the large cities in Florida would have become "open cities in closed areas" (since, in reciprocity, nearly 70% of our large cities had to be left open).

None of the foregoing reasons are suitable for unclassified discussion, nor are they, for the most part, factors developed by the Department of Defense. Attached (Tab D) is a thoughtful article from the Christian Science Monitor of 4 January 1955. This article does in fact explain the reasoning behind the decisions made in the implementation of governmental decision to restrict Soviet travel. The article should serve to satisfy, in part, Mr. Bennett's natural feeling that Florida was perhaps "slighted".

A reply has been drafted again in general terms, pointing out that the Defense Department cannot answer questions as to the reasoning behind the decisions arrived at by the joint committee (and concurred in by the Armed Forces, State, Justice, ODM, CIA and AEC).

Recommendation: Signature and dispatch of proposed reply.

Coordination: State Department and FBI.

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Review of this document by CIA has determined that

☒ CIA has no objection to declass  
☐ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S U  
Authority: HR 10-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest  
Date 7 Feb 83 Reviewer 042028

ATCH 1

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

January 31, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Review

During the systematic review of all classified Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) documents being carried out under the guidelines of Executive Order 12356, the Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Washington Headquarters Services, turned up the attached document(s).

The documents were either originated by your agency, contain information for which your agency is the classification authority, or are otherwise of interest to you.

It is requested that your agency review the documents and recommend declassification, continued classification at the present or lesser level of classification, and/or review by other agencies.

It is requested that you provide response within 60 days so that a decision on the disposition of the documents may be made promptly. In your response, you may wish to provide guidance with regard to what categories of information you do and do not wish to have referred to you in the future.

Your assistance in effecting this review will be most appreciated. Please return the documents to Mr. Brian V. Kinney, Chief, Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Washington Headquarters Services, Room 1D517, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301, upon completion of your review.

Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

*E. E. Lowry, Jr.*  
E. E. Lowry, Jr.  
OSD Records Administrator

Attachments (1) Paper, re: The Vulnerability of Florida to Intelligence Exploitation, Feb 9, 1955 (C).

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